Barbara Crouse v. Human Resources Consulting Group, Inc., Robert J. Thurston : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
Barbara Crouse v. Human Resources Consulting
Group, Inc., Robert J. Thurston : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christopher A. Tolboe; Murphy, Tolbooe, & Mabey, P.C.; attorneys for appellant.
Brian J. Babcock, Esq.; Walstad & Babcock; attorneys for appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Barbara Crouse v. Human Resources Consulting Group, Inc., Robert J. Thurston, No. 950119 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6463
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARBARA CROUSE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs, 
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING 
GROUP, INC., a Utah corpor-
ation, and ROBERT J. 
THURSTON, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Appeal NO.950119-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a Decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake Salt Lake County, 
Judge Ronald 0. Hyde 
BRIAN J. BABCOCK 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
57 W. South Temple, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
UTAH CGUET CF APPEALS 
UTT'-I 
DCC U..L:.\ r 
K F U 
LOCKET NO. -3501H 
CHRISTOPHER A. TOLBOE #A3678 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Appellants 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505^»jj C O 
MAY 2 41995 
COUHT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COUBT OF APPEALS 
BARBARA CROUSE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
HUMAN RESOURCES CONSULTING 
GROUP, INC., a Utah corpor-
ation/ and ROBERT J. 
THURSTON, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Appeal NO.950119-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from a Decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake Salt Lake County, 
Judge Ronald 0. Hyde 
BRIAN J. BABCOCK 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
57 W. South Temple, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CHRISTOPHER A. TOLBOE #A3678 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Appellants 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities ii 
Argument 1 
POINT I 
HRCG HAS MET THE MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT TO 
CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT' S FINDINGS OF FACT . . . . 1 
POINT II 
IF THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT HRCG 
REACHED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WITH 
CROUSE, THE ACCORD WAS SATISFIED BY THE 
PAYMENT OF $14,000 1 
POINT III 
THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
DOES NOT SATISFY THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF 
CONTRACT LAW 2 
Conclusion 4 
X 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Burton v. Coombs, 557 P2d 148 (Utah 1976) 3 
Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 
863 P2d 29 (Utah App 1993) 3 
Crane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 860 P2d 943 (Utah App 1989) 3 
Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 
849 P2d 1187 (Utah App 1993) 3 
Engineering Associates v. Irving Place Associates, 
622 P2d 784 (Utah 1980) 4 
TebJbs, Smith & Assoc v. Brooks, 735 P2d 1305 (Utah 1987) . . . 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HRCG HAS NET THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT TO 
CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT' S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Crouse argues that HRCG has not met its burden in marshaling 
evidence in support of the trial court' s findings of fact prior to 
demonstrating that the evidence does not support the findings. In 
essence, Crouse' s argument amounts to a requirement that HRCG 
present all of the evidence which was before the trial court. 
This goes well beyond the marshaling requirement. If all of the 
evidence must be considered by the appellate court, it is 
available in the record. 
Crouse provides extensive record and transcript citations 
supposedly supporting all of the trial court' s findings of fact. 
Crouse has not addressed the issues raised by HRCG. HRCG must 
marshall evidence only with regard to the specific findings which 
it challenges, not all of the findings entered by the trial court. 
In its Appellant' s Brief, HRCG challenged only the trial court* s 
finding that it had made a settlement offer or agreed to an 
accord. It then marshaled the scant evidence which would support 
those specific findings. The marshaling requirement was 
adequately met and does not require that this Court re-weigh the 
evidence, but merely determine its sufficiency to support the 
findings. 
POINT II 
IF THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT HRCG 
REACHED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WITH 
CROUSE, THE ACCORD WAS SATISFIED BY THE 
PAYMENT OF $14,000. 
The fundamental premise behind accord and satisfaction is 
1 
that it is available as a defense to show that substitute 
performance was tendered and accepted in full satisfaction of any 
previous contractual duties owed to a party. 
An accord and satisfaction arises when the 
parties to a contract mutually agree that a 
performance different than that required by 
the original contract will be made in 
substitution of the performance originally 
agreed upon and that the substituted 
agreement calling for a different performance 
will discharge the obligation created under 
the original agreement. 
Tebbs, Smith & Assoc v. Brooks, 735 P2d 1305, 1307 (Utah 1987) 
HRCG would accept a finding that an accord and satisfaction 
disposed of this matter, i.e. the satisfaction being the payment 
of $14,000 in full settlement of the claims between the parties. 
Once a satisfaction to an accord has been accepted by a party, 
that party no longer has a contractual claim for performance 
beyond the satisfaction. As such, if Crouse accepted the $14,000 
in her uaccord and satisfaction" , she cannot legally pursue an 
additional recovery, as her acceptence of the payment is intended 
as her full recovery of all amounts due and owing under the 
contract. 
POINT III 
THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
DOES NOT SATISFY THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF 
CONTRACT LAW. 
Contrary to Crouse1 s arguments, the alleged agreement for 
substituted performance does not meet the basic requirements of 
contract law. Fundamental to any contract is a meeting of the 
minds on the exchanged promises of the parties. There are many 
ways of describing this meeting of the minds, but essentially, the 
2 
intentions and expectations of the parties control. E.g., 
Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P2d 29, 37 (Utah App 
1993) ("A meeting of the minds between contracting parties is 
essential to the formation of any contract" ); Sparrow v. Tayco 
Construction Co., 846 P2d 1323, 1327 (Utah App 1993) certiorari 
denied 857 P2d 948 (to determine whether documents constitute 
offers as opposed to written contracts, the court must determine 
whether there was umutual assent to all the essential terms.") 
When an offer is made which specifies the manner in which it 
must be accepted, i.e. in a final written document signed by both 
parties, it can only be accepted in the manner specified. 
When an offer specifies the manner in which 
it must be accepted , it can only be accepted 
in the specified manner. Otherwise mutual 
assent is lacking, and no contract is formed. 
Equitable Life & Cas Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 
App 1993) certiorari denied 860 P2d 943 (emphasis added, citing 
Crane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 774 P2d 3, 4 (Utah App 1989); 
Burton v. Coombs, 557 P2d 148, 148-49 (Utah 1976). 
It is clear from the evidence in this case that HRCG did not 
intend to be bound by any negotiation settlements until an 
agreement had been reduced to writing and signed by both parties. 
No such agreement was ever written by the parties. HRCG included 
in its "compromise" offers express provisions that it would not be 
bound until any agreement was reduced to a writing signed by both 
parties. To further avoid any implication that a writing had been 
created by the "compromise" offers, HRCG sent the letters on plain 
paper rather than company letterhead and intentionally unsigned by 
3 
its president. Its intent is unambiguous. 
If the parties clearly do not wish to be bound by legal 
consequences arising from negotiations until an agreement has been 
signed, there can be no agreement. 
There does not appear to be any doubt that if 
the parties make it clear that they do not 
intend that there should be legal 
consequences unless and until a formal 
writing is executed, there is no contract 
until that time. 
Engineering Associates v. Irving Place Associates, 622 P2d 784, 
787 (Utah 1980). HRCG made it clear, by express provision in 
writing, that it did not wish to be legally bound unless and until 
a formal writing was executed. There was never such a formal 
writing. Under Utah law, there was no meeting of the minds and 
there was no contract. 
The most fundamental legal requirements to formation of a 
valid contract have not been met in this case. Crouse' s claims to 
a legal remedy as a result of the Hnegotiated settlement" are 
unsupported by a valid contract and she is not entitled to prevail 
on a claim based upon breach of that alleged contract. 
CONCLUSION 
HRCG has properly met the its burden to challenge a specific 
finding of the trial court. Aside from the factual issues, 
however, there is no basis in contract law for finding that a 
valid, enforceable agreement emerged from the negotiations of the 
parties until the essential terms of the offer were met. The 
essence of contracts, a meeting of the minds, is lacking in this 
case and no new contract has been formed. Therefore, no remedy 
can be granted for breach of an offer not accepted pursuant to its 
4 
terms. Therefore the terms of the original contract 
determine the amounts due and owing to the plaintiff. 
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